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I. INTRODUCTION
Millions of people have extraordinary hopes for the new International
Criminal Court ("ICC"), the world's first permanent tribunal for genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity. As the most highly visible and ambitious
permanent institution in furtherance of international justice ever created, the
ICC simply cannot fail. These lofty expectations, however, should be tempered
by a number of factors. Some are obvious, such as whether the ICC will be
given adequate financial and logistical support and whether the ICC's initial
Prosecutor and judges will perform their duties capably and responsibly. Other
factors, while less obvious, are no less important in determining how the ICC
will operate and how it will be perceived. Chief among these are concerns
relating to the ICC's pretrial procedures, which are unusual and largely untested.
Indeed, the principles that guide these procedures-"admissibility,"
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"complementarity" and "State consent"-are not concepts that any national or
international court has extensive experience in adjudicating.
Designed to give effect to the fundamental principle that the ICC must be
a court of last resort, these procedures also involve weighty political issues
regarding the genuineness of a government's representation that it will (or will
not) prosecute an accused. The stakes in every case before the ICC, moreover,
will be enormous: not only will the ICC determine an individual's culpability
for the most serious crimes but such determinations are inherently imbued with
political conflicts and sensitivities. The consequence is that counsel will likely
take full advantage of these pretrial procedures which, in practical terms, may
mean that the first cases before the ICC may be consumed by months or even
years of pretrial motion practice.
These motions will pose an enormous challenge for the ICC's judges
because, although they will certainly need to act expeditiously, they will also
have to get it right. The first pretrial motions to be decided will shape initial
perceptions of the ICC and largely determine the new institution's credibility.
Any decisions that are perceived as politically motivated or legally unprincipled
could have lasting repercussions. These extraordinary pressures on the ICC's
judges must be handled in the context of resolving the numerous pretrial
motions that are permitted by the Rome Statute's cumbersome pretrial
framework, which results from a confluence of the following factors.
First, the system of complementarity between the ICC and national courts,
designed to permit national courts to take precedence, will require significant
pretrial motions if it is to work as anticipated. The ICC is only supposed to
prosecute when a national court with jurisdiction is unable or unwilling to
legitimately proceed, and this principle is given effect through procedures
governing "admissibility." In large part, these procedures are due to the fact
that the Rome Statute was written during political negotiations between
governments, and some governments were uncomfortable with untethered
prosecutorial power. The United States negotiators in the 1998 Rome
Diplomatic Conference, in particular, ensured that the ICC's jurisdiction would
be narrow, that cases could only proceed in circumstances when a national court
could not do the job, and that the Prosecutor's discretion would be
circumscribed. These issues will be teed up by pretrial motions arguing a
government's genuine willingness or ability to investigate.
Second, the unusual State consent requirements that apply in cases not
initiated by the Security Council require the consent of either the terroritorial
State or the State of the nationality of the accused. Consent is given by the act
of ratification or (for non-State parties) by a special declaration. While this may
seem straightforward, ambiguities regarding cross-border conduct and even a
person's nationality may lead parties to make motions arguing that a State's
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consent is inadequate because the conduct "occurred" outside its territory or
because the accused is a "national" of another State.
Third, safeguards designed to prevent politically motivated prosecutions
mean that the Prosecutor will have to seek and obtain authorization from the
Pre-Trial Chamber to proceed.
Fourth, the fact that victims are permitted to have representation before the
ICC, even in the pretrial investigatory stages, may complicate pretrial
proceedings. Thousand of victims may mean thousands of lawyers with the
right under the Rome Statute to make submissions at certain stages.
Finally, the omnipresent right to appeal may serve to derail investigations
as multiple parties exercise rights of appeal that exist even regarding
interlocutory admissibility and jurisdictional issues.
The question that should be asked is whether-apart from serving the political
purposes of the Rome Statute's creators-these procedures will advance the
goals of ending impunity for international crimes and contributing to the
prevention of such crimes. Only time will tell, of course, and almost everything
about the ICC's pretrial procedure is a venture into uncharted territory. The
ICC's system of State consent, admissibility and complementarity differs
significantly from previous international criminal tribunals; indeed, it is largely
sui generis. Because of the nature of the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction,
every decision of the ICC will have political overtones, especially ones deciding
the question of whether a national government has engaged in an "unjustified
delay"' .in bringing a person to justice. These pretrial decisions also invite
motions and submissions by States and other entities and persons.
There is another risk resulting from protracted pretrial proceedings: persons
may be identified as targets of the ICC long before trial. An accused, of course,
can object to the charges and challenge evidence at a confirmation hearing
under Article 61, which requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to determine whether
"substantial grounds" exist to believe the person committed the crimes.
However, to the extent that pretrial proceedings unduly lengthen the time when
a target of an investigation has been named and the resolution of that person's
trial, the rights of persons accused of crimes by the ICC may be adversely
affected. The eighteen judges of the ICC will have to resolve these challenges
and administer the Rome Statute in a fair, impartial and decisive manner.
1. United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 2(b), 37
I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter "Rome Statute"].
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II. GETTING OFF THE GROUND: REFERRALS BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND
STATE PARTIES
Three entities may initiate investigations: the Security Council, State
Parties or the Prosecutor. Cases referred by the Security Council will likely
proceed quicker through the pretrial stages than cases referred by State Parties
or initiated by the Prosecutor. Security Council referrals, which are made
pursuant to the Security Council's universally binding powers under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter,' .are not subject to the State consent requirements. In
addition, preliminary rulings regarding admissibility are not permitted. And, of
course, there would be no threat of a Security Council deferral.
The best hope for avoiding ICC pretrial gridlock, then, is for cases to
originate with Security Council referrals. This avenue, however, at least for the
foreseeable future, is unrealistic. The United States, with its veto over any
Security Council action, remains steadfastly opposed to the ICC. It is highly
unlikely, therefore, that the United States will permit any Security Council
referrals to the ICC. It remains to be seen whether this will change when the
Security Council attempts to refer a matter that does not infringe on United
States interests. For example, in October 2002, President Bush signed the
Sudan Peace Act, which accused the Sudanese government of genocide. Would
the United States use its veto to prevent the Security Council from referring a
genocide prosecution of Sudan to the ICC?
Referrals by State Parties offer a slightly more streamlined alternative to
investigations by the Prosecutor because the investigation can commence
without the necessity of a determination by the Pre-Trial Chamber. Under
Article 14, any State Party is entitled to refer to the Prosecutor a "situation in
which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have
been committed."3 State referrals must be "in writing.",4 Following such a
referral, the Prosecutor investigates the situation and determines whether any
"specific persons should be charged."5
The Statute provides little guidance on the content of referrals except that
the submission "shall specify the relevant circumstances" and must "be
accompanied by such supporting documentation as is available to the State
referring the situation."6 There is no requirement that a referral be made public.
The Prosecutor does have discretion to decline to investigate a State Party's
referral if "there is no reasonable basis to proceed," taking into consideration:
2. Id. at art. 12(3)(b).
3. Id. at art. 14(I).
4. Rule of Procedure and Evidence 45.
5. Rome Statute, supra note I, at art. 14(l).
6. Id. at art. 14(2).
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(1) whether there is no legal or factual basis to seek a warrant or a summons; (2)
whether the case is inadmissible because a national court has exercised
jurisdiction; or (3) whether prosecution is "not in the interests of justice."7 The
Pre-Trial Chamber may, at the request of the referring State or the Security
Council, review the Prosecutor's decision not to proceed. 8 The Pre-Trial
Chamber also may act "on its own initiative" to review decisions of the
Prosecutor not to proceed based on the "interests of justice" criteria.9 This
presents yet another avenue for pretrial proceedings: disputes between the Pre-
Trial Chamber (acting on its own or at the behest of a State or the Security
Council) and the Prosecutor regarding the propriety of the Prosecutor's decision
not to proceed.
111. FIRST HURDLE: REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION
Due to Security Council paralysis, the Prosecutor probably will originate
most investigations. In investigations initiated by the Prosecutor, however, the
potential for gridlock arises early because although the Prosecutor can "initiate"
an investigation he or she cannot "commence" an investigation without
authorization. This authorization comes from the Pre-Trial Chamber, which at
several critical stages is given oversight when the Prosecutor acts independently.
In contrast, the Prosecutor needs no such authorization to commence an
investigation when the referral comes from the Security Council or a State
Party.
There are no limits on the sources from which the Prosecutor can receive
information.'0 Following receipt of such information, the Prosecutor "may
initiate investigations." At this early stage, before the necessity of requesting
authorization, the Prosecutor is given leeway to look into a situation and to
conduct a preliminary investigation unfettered by outside limitations. Thus, the
Prosecutor may "analyze the seriousness of the information received," and may
even "seek additional information" from states, nongovernmental organizations,
international organizations or any "other reliable sources."" Even at this
preliminary stage, State Parties are obliged to "cooperate fully" with any
requests for information.'2
7. Id. at art. 53(2).
8. Id. at art. 53(3)(a).
9. Id. at art. 53(3)(b).
10. Id. at art. 15(2).
11. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art 15(2).
12. Id. at art. 86.
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The Prosecutor is also permitted to "receive written or oral testimony at the
seat of the Court."' 3 This testimony may be recorded or videotaped, 14 .and
presumably may later be admissible at trial. This geographical limitation,
permitting testimony only "at the seat of the Court" in The Hague, seems
designed to limit the Prosecutor's fact-finding capabilities by curtailing on-site
investigatory capacity before the Pre-Trial Chamber has given authorization.
Once this preliminary investigation is concluded, the Prosecutor will either
determine that further proceedings are not required or that there is "a reasonable
basis to proceed with an investigation."'" If the latter, 6 .then the Prosecutor
"shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an
investigation."' 7 Requests for authorization under Article 15(4) seem to be
essentially ex parte, with no allowance made for submissions in opposition,
although victims are permitted to "make representations" to the Pre-Trial
Chamber.
The criterion to be applied by the three-judge Pre-Trial Chamber is
somewhat vague: it need only determine whether "there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with an investigation and that the case appears to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court."' 8 If so, then the Pre-Trial Chamber "shall authorize
the commencement of an investigation."' 9 It remains to be seen whether Article
15(4) authorizations will be a significant roadblock for investigations initiated
by the Prosecutor or merely a rubber stamp. This is one-sided request, with
potential targets not permitted to make submissions. As a result, this stage may
be more mechanical than substantive. The Pre-Trial Chamber, however, has a
strong interest in ensuring that the jurisdictional basis of an Article 15(4)
authorization is proper and therefore will have compelling reasons making
sound Article 15(4) determinations.
The request-for-authorization stage will also serve to publicize an
investigation because the Prosecutor is required to notify victims. The means
of notification may be through the Victims and Witnesses Unit or "by general
means" consistently with the integrity of the investigation and the safety of
13. Id. at art. 15(2).
14. Rule of Procedure and Evidence 112.
15. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 18(1).
16. Somewhat conversely, art. 53(1) of the Rome Statute states that "the Prosecutor shall initiate
an investigation unless he or she determines there is no reasonable basis to proceed." In referrals by the
Security Council or a State, this seems to create a presumption that an investigation will be initiated unless
the Prosecutor determines otherwise.
17. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 15(3).
18. Id. at art. 15(4).
19. Id.
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victims and witnesses.2" Although the notice is of a general "investigation," it
is possible that the notification process may have unintended consequences by
identifying targets at a preliminary stage and by impacting the presumption of
innocence or by triggering actions by persons subject to the investigation.
However, this should be viewed as an acceptable trade-off because the notice
provision advances the legitimate goals of minimizing frivolous prosecutions
and maintaining transparency.
IV. SECOND HURDLE: NOTIFICATION AND POSSIBLE STATE DEFERRAL
The next threshold involves notification of certain States not only of a
generalized investigation but of an intention to investigate and prosecute
persons alleged to have committed crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction. This
notification process begins once the Pre-Trial Chamber authorizes the
"commencement" of an investigation under Article 15 or once a State Party
makes a referral and the Prosecutor determines that there is "a reasonable basis
to proceed."'"
At this stage, the Prosecutor must issue a written notice to all States,
including States not party to the Rome Statute, that "would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the crimes concerned." The notice may be "on a confidential
basis" if necessary "to protect persons, prevent destruction of evidence or
prevent the absconding of persons. 22
A State receiving notice has one month from receipt to inform the Court
"that it is investigating or has investigated" persons within its jurisdiction.23 If
requested, the Prosecutor "shall defer to the State's investigation." State
deferrals have no time limit and may permanently stop an investigation. The
purpose is to give teeth to the premise of the Rome Statute that national courts
have primacy. All a national government has to do is make a request and the
ICC must defer-although, as discussed in Part V infra, such deferral may be
reviewed in six months "based on the State's unwillingness or inability
genuinely to carry out the investigation. ''24
The mandatory nature of Article 18(2) deferrals-the Prosecutor "shall
defer to the State's investigation" upon receipt of a request to do so-may prove
difficult to overcome. If multiple states assert jurisdiction, there may be
multiple States making Article 18(2) requests. The result could be years of
delay.
20. Rule of Procedure and Evidence 50(l).
21. Rome Statute, supra note I, at art. 18(l).
22. Id. at art. 18(1).
23. Id. at art. 18(2).
24. Id. at art. 18(3).
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V. THIRD HURDLE: PRELIMINARY RULING ON ADMISSIBILITY AND APPEAL
Although the Prosecutor must stop the investigation upon receipt of a
request,25 .the mandatory cessation can be circumvented if the Prosecutor makes
an application to the Pre-Trial Chamber to "authorize the investigation"
notwithstanding a State's request for a deferral.26 Upon such application, the
Pre-Trial Chamber can nonetheless "decide[] to authorize the investigation. 27
It appears that only the Prosecutor can make such an application, and that State
Parties do not have standing to do so. The standards to be applied by the Pre-
Trial Chamber, as well as the timing, are somewhat elastic. The Prosecutor can
seek review in six months, presumably on any basis, or "at any time when there
has been a significant change of circumstances based on the State's
unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out the investigation."
The "preliminary" ruling is also the first opportunity for a trip to the
Appellate Chamber. In one of the more open-ended articles of the Rome
Statute, either the Prosecutor or the State concerned may appeal any decision
"with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility" within five days of an adverse
decision. 28 The likely effect of an appeal will be to suspend proceedings for
many months because, even though the Article 82(3) of the Rome Statute states
that an appeal "shall not of itself have suspensive effect," the Rules permit the
appellant to request, in effect, a stay pending appeal.29 Certainly a State that has
previously served a deferral request under Article 18(2) would demand a stay
pending an appeal of a decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber vacating a deferral.
Even an adverse decision of a preliminary ruling at this stage, however,
does not prevent a State from challenging admissibility at later stages of the
proceedings. Indeed, in an apparent recipe for gridlock, Article 18(7)
guarantees the right of a State which has failed in a preliminary motion on
admissibility to make a separate motion on admissibility at a later stage. While
Article 18(7) requires a change in facts and circumstances, this should not be a
burdensome hurdle to overcome. As a result, in cases where the crimes in
question occurred in several States or involve persons of different nationalities,
there may be multiple motions and appeals on the same admissibility issue
under both Article 17 and Article 19.
25. In "exceptional" cases, the Prosecutor can continue to collect evidence in spite of a State request
if necessary to preserve evidence. Rome Statute, supra note I, at art. 18(6).
26. Authorizations under article 18(2) must be made by a majority of the three judges of the Pre-
Trial Chamber. Rome Statute, supra note I, at art. 57(2)(a).
27. Rome Statute, supra note I, at art. 18(2).
28. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 82(l)(a); Rule of Procedure and Evidence 154(1).
29. Rule of Procedure and Evidence 156(5).
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VI. FOURTH HURDLE: JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY
CHALLENGES AND APPEALS
As noted, the most active areas for pretrial motion practice relate to issues
of jurisdiction and admissibility. These issues relate to the Court's basic
competence to hear a case, and can be raised at any time before or at the
commencement of trial (or after, if the basis is that the person has already been
tried). Indeed, it is likely that a new area of legal expertise will evolve
pertaining to admissibility challenges under Articles 17 and 19 focusing on
whether a national court is able or willing to prosecute. The area demands the
creation of uniform standards so that the adjudication of these issues will appear
objective. National court judges and other international legal scholars may offer
the equivalent of expert testimony regarding the legitimacy of a government's
investigation.
Procedurally, the Rome Statute treats jurisdictional and admissibility
similarly. The Court's "jurisdiction" encompasses both the substantive crimes
to be prosecuted by the ICC, and the system of State consent. Thus, a
jurisdictional challenge could argue that the actions of the accused do not
constitute crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. In addition, jurisdictional
challenges could argue that (assuming no Security Council referral), either the
territorial State or the State of nationality of the accused has not consented
because, for example, there are questions about the citizenship of the defendant
or, in crimes that occur in several countries, the State in which the conduct
occurred.
The potential for lengthy delays resulting from Article 19 challenges to
admissibility and jurisdiction arises from the fact that the Rome Statute places
no clear limits on the number of these motions that can be made and on the
parties that can make them. Consider, for example, the list of entities eligible
to bring motions challenging admissibility and jurisdiction:
1) An accused;
2) A person for whom a warrant or summons has been issued
based on a finding of the Pre-Trial Chamber that reasonable
grounds exist to believe the person committed a crime within
the jurisdiction of the ICC;
3) A State which has jurisdiction over a case and has investigated
or prosecuted;
4) The State of nationality of the accused;
5) The territorial State; and
6) The Prosecutor or the Court.:
30. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 19(2), (3).
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Each of these entities appears to have the ability to bring motions regarding
jurisdiction and admissibility; and each motion may suspend the investigation
and then be appealed. It is not too far-fetched to imagine multiple motions
brought seriatim on essentially the same area.
There is a textual argument for strictly limiting motion practice. Article
19(4) states that jurisdiction and admissibility challenges can be brought "only
once by any person or State." This would have to be interpreted literally -
"only once" means "only once." However, because each moving party would
have different circumstances and arguments, it seems improbable this literal
approach would be adopted because it could lead to unfairness in many cases.
The more likely interpretation is that each person or State is limited to one bite
at the apple, and not that all States and persons collectively are limited to a
single challenge. Moreover, Article 19(6) refers to "challenges" to admissibility
and to jurisdiction, suggesting multiple opportunities.
Article 19 challenges are unlikely to be expeditious. The issue of the
adequacy of a State's investigation may require significant testimony and
evidence to the extent the inquiry goes to the merits. When brought by a State,
moreover, Article 19(7) requires the Prosecutor to suspend the investigation.
"Observations" from other interested States, the Security Council and from
victims must be solicited, and the Pre-Trial Chamber may hold a hearing. These
hearings will probably be mini-trials, especially if a State is attempting to prove
the genuineness of its investigation. Article 19 challenges conceivably could
tie up the ICC for years if there are serial motions with suspensive effect that are
subject to appeal.
VII. FIFTH HURDLE: SECURITY COUNCIL DEFERRAL
Functioning as a kind of sword of Damocles over the ICC, the Security
Council has the power to intervene under Article 16 to stop any investigation
or prosecution for renewable twelve-month periods. The mechanism in Article
16 is a resolution adopted under the Security Council's enforcement powers in
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The ICC has no authority to circumvent such
a Security Council resolution.
The purpose of Article 16 was to permit the Security Council to prevent the
ICC from proceeding when an ICC prosecution might interfere with ongoing
diplomatic negotiations necessary to maintain international security. An open
question is whether the Security Council would permit Article 16 to be used not
because of ongoing diplomatic negotiations but rather because of a Security
Council member's ideological bias against any ICC investigation or
prosecution.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Pretrial proceedings before the International Criminal Court present
unusual and unprecedented challenges. The Rome Statute requires that national
courts be given every opportunity to prosecute the crimes within the ICC's
jurisdiction, and that the Prosecutor's independence be limited. The only way
to make these requirements real is to permit challenges to be made to the ICC's
ability to exercise its jurisdiction. The Rome Statute, however, creates a recipe
for lengthy delays by permitting multiple challenges and appeals in the same
areas.
The judges of the ICC face a daunting task in effectuating these principles
of the Rome Statute while at the same time protecting the rights of defenilants
to a swift and fair trial and ensuring that the victims of the world's worst crimes
receive redress. They will have to decide many thorny questions, such as how
to limit admissibility motions and whether a government is unable or unwilling
to prosecute. These are largely issues that no judges in any national or
international court have had to deal with in such a systematic fashion. The
discretion and wisdom with which the ICC's initial judges and Prosecutor deal
with these issues will largely determine the ultimate success of the International
Criminal Court in achieving its critically important purpose.
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